Mike Brady
b405c0b896
New Features:
Multi-Channel and High-Resolution Audio Support
48,000 frames per second ("48k") operation.
48k lossless stereo support.
5.1 and 7.1 surround sound support.
Multi-channel and multi-rate operation on ALSA, PipeWire, PulseAudio, FreeBSD, stdout and Unix pipe output backends.
Automatic Audio Format Selection
Flexible and controllable output format selection.
Automatic rate, sample format, and channel count selection.
Full FFmpeg Integration
Support for transcoding.
Advanced resampling capabilities.
New audio format support.
Enhanced Resampling
New vernier resampling and interpolation method optimized for low-power CPUs.
Better performance on resource-constrained devices.
Convolution and Loudness Enhancements:
Convolution system is now multithreaded and works on stereo and multichannel audio at 48k and 44.1k.
Multiple impulse response (IR) files can now be provided via convolution_ir_files setting.
New convolution_thread_pool_size setting for multithreaded processing (defaults to 1).
Loudness processing now works with stereo and multichannel audio at 48k and 44.1k.
Updated to the most recent HiFi-LoFi FFT convolver.
MQTT Enhancements:
Added new publish_retain boolean option. When enabled, published MQTT messages have the retain flag set, so the MQTT broker stores the last message per topic and new subscribers receive the most recent value immediately. Thanks to lululombard for PR #2142.
D-Bus Enhancements:
Added new dbus_default_message_bus command-line argument (can be system or session) to set the default message bus for both D-Bus native service and MPRIS service.
Performance Improvements:
Enhanced compatibility with AirPlay 2 AutoMix and Smart Tracklists resulting in less unexplained track skipping.
Better operation on low-power devices down to Raspberry Pi B.
Improved efficiency on embedded systems.
Enhanced timestamp handling for better synchronization.
Improved sync error calculation.
Rebuilt buffered audio processor for cleaner handling of immediate and deferred flush requests.
Docker Enhancements:
Reduced Docker image sizes with slimmed-down FFmpeg library.
Removed dhclient from Docker images for smaller footprint.
Bug Fixes:
Fixed MQTT warning on service startup: "Could not establish a mqtt connection". The startup script now correctly states that the mosquitto service is required. Thanks to Hugo Villeneuve for PR #2137.
Fixed compatibility with mbedtls library version 3.4+ (present on recent Linux versions). Thanks to Christian Beier for finding and fixing the bug.
Fixed PulseAudio backend so that PA_ERR_NODATA returns "No latency data yet". Thanks to Vladimir Shakov for the report and fix.
Ensured old flush requests are deleted when a new play session starts. Thanks to saujanyashah for the report.
Fixed format warnings on 64-bit and 32-bit systems
Removed compilation warnings on 32-bit builds
Improved argument checking for debug(), inform(), warn() and die() functions
Fixed "daemon" typos throughout codebase. Thanks to Chris Boot for PR #1981.
Added warning if a convolution impulse response file cannot be read due to bad path or permissions
Build System Improvements:
Unified service file with variable substitution for Avahi support, making it easier to add future service dependencies. Thanks to Hugo Villeneuve.
Network interface selection now only considers interfaces that are up, running and not loopback interfaces. Thanks to Carl Johnson for the suggestion.
Configuration File Changes and Deprecations
New settings: convolution_ir_files (replaces convolution_ir_file), convolution_enabled (replaces convolution), convolution_max_length_in_seconds (replaces convolution_max_length), loudness_enabled (replaces loudness).
New convolution_thread_pool_size setting (defaults to 1).
Deprecated settings: convolution_ir_file, convolution, convolution_max_length, loudness.
Corresponding D-Bus methods and properties have been updated.
Deprecation Notice:
The Jack Audio and soundio backends are deprecated and will be removed in a future release. Consider using the updated PipeWire backend instead.
Documentation Updates
Updated BUILD.md with latest build instructions.
Updated AIRPLAY2.md with feature information.
Enhanced convolution and loudness documentation.
Maintenance:
Fixed FFmpeg deprecation warnings.
Bumped actions/checkout from 6.0.1 to 6.0.2.
Bumped docker/login-action from 3.6.0 to 3.7.0.
Bumped docker/build-push-action from 6.13.0 to 6.15.0.
Bumped docker/setup-qemu-action from 3.4.0 to 3.6.0.
Bumped docker/setup-buildx-action from 3.9.0 to 3.10.0.
3239 lines
90 KiB
C
3239 lines
90 KiB
C
/*
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* Adaption of ap2-sender by ViktoriiaKh:
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* <https://github.com/ViktoriiaKh/ap2-sender>
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*
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* To test, it is useful to try with this receiver:
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* <https://github.com/ckdo/airplay2-receiver>
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*
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* The Secure Remote Password 6a implementation is adapted from:
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* - Tom Cocagne
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* <https://github.com/cocagne/csrp>
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*
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* TLV helpers are adapted from ESP homekit:
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* <https://github.com/maximkulkin/esp-homekit>
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*
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* The MIT License (MIT)
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*
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* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
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* this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
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* the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to
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* use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies
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* of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do
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* so, subject to the following conditions:
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*
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* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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* copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
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* AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
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* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
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* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
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* SOFTWARE.
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*
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <inttypes.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <sodium.h>
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#include "pair-internal.h"
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#include "pair-tlv.h"
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/* ----------------------------- DEFINES ETC ------------------------------- */
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#define USERNAME "Pair-Setup"
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#define AUTHTAG_LENGTH 16
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#define NONCE_LENGTH 12 // 96 bits according to chacha poly1305
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#define REQUEST_BUFSIZE 4096
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#define ENCRYPTED_LEN_MAX 0x400
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// #define DEBUG_SHORT_A 1
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enum pair_keys
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{
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PAIR_SETUP_MSG01 = 0,
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PAIR_SETUP_MSG02,
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PAIR_SETUP_MSG03,
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PAIR_SETUP_MSG04,
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PAIR_SETUP_MSG05,
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PAIR_SETUP_MSG06,
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PAIR_SETUP_CONTROLLER_SIGN,
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PAIR_SETUP_ACCESSORY_SIGN,
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PAIR_VERIFY_MSG01,
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PAIR_VERIFY_MSG02,
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PAIR_VERIFY_MSG03,
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PAIR_VERIFY_MSG04,
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PAIR_CONTROL_WRITE,
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PAIR_CONTROL_READ,
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PAIR_EVENTS_WRITE,
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PAIR_EVENTS_READ,
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PAIR_DATA_WRITE,
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PAIR_DATA_READ,
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};
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struct pair_keys_map
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{
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uint8_t state;
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const char *salt;
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const char *info;
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const char nonce[8];
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};
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static struct pair_keys_map pair_keys_map[] =
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{
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// Used for /pair-setup
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{ 0x01, NULL, NULL, "" },
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{ 0x02, NULL, NULL, "" },
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{ 0x03, NULL, NULL, "" },
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{ 0x04, NULL, NULL, "" },
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{ 0x05, "Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Salt", "Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Info", "PS-Msg05" },
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{ 0x06, "Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Salt", "Pair-Setup-Encrypt-Info", "PS-Msg06" },
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{ 0, "Pair-Setup-Controller-Sign-Salt", "Pair-Setup-Controller-Sign-Info", "" },
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{ 0, "Pair-Setup-Accessory-Sign-Salt", "Pair-Setup-Accessory-Sign-Info", "" },
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// Used for /pair-verify
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{ 0x01, NULL, NULL, "" },
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{ 0x02, "Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Salt", "Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Info", "PV-Msg02" },
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{ 0x03, "Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Salt", "Pair-Verify-Encrypt-Info", "PV-Msg03" },
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{ 0x04, NULL, NULL, "" },
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// Encryption/decryption of control channel
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{ 0, "Control-Salt", "Control-Write-Encryption-Key", "" },
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{ 0, "Control-Salt", "Control-Read-Encryption-Key", "" },
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// Encryption/decryption of event channel
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{ 0, "Events-Salt", "Events-Write-Encryption-Key", "" },
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{ 0, "Events-Salt", "Events-Read-Encryption-Key", "" },
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// Encryption/decryption of data channel
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// The salt is dynamic -- the 64-bit `seed` provided during SETUP, treated as an unsigned unmber, is appended:
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// e.g. DataStream-Salt15014746994705656022.
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// Sincere thanks to Pierre Stahl, (latex: St\aahl) https://github.com/postlund.
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// Please see https://pyatv.dev/documentation/protocols/#remote-control, AirPlay 2 / Remote Control / Data Channel / Encryption
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{ 0, "DataStream-Salt", "DataStream-Output-Encryption-Key", "" },
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{ 0, "DataStream-Salt", "DataStream-Input-Encryption-Key", "" },
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};
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enum pair_method {
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PairingMethodPairSetup = 0x00,
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PairingMethodPairSetupWithAuth = 0x01,
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PairingMethodPairVerify = 0x02,
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PairingMethodAddPairing = 0x03,
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PairingMethodRemovePairing = 0x04,
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PairingMethodListPairings = 0x05
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};
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enum pair_flags {
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PairingFlagsTransient = 0x10,
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};
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// Forwards
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const struct pair_definition pair_client_homekit_normal;
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const struct pair_definition pair_client_homekit_transient;
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const struct pair_definition pair_server_homekit;
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/* ---------------------------------- SRP ----------------------------------- */
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typedef enum
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{
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SRP_NG_2048,
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SRP_NG_3072,
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SRP_NG_CUSTOM
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} SRP_NGType;
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typedef struct
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{
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int N_len;
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bnum N;
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bnum g;
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} NGConstant;
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struct SRPUser
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{
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enum hash_alg alg;
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NGConstant *ng;
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bnum a;
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bnum A;
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bnum S;
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const unsigned char *bytes_A;
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int authenticated;
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char *username;
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unsigned char *password;
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int password_len;
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unsigned char M [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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unsigned char H_AMK [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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unsigned char session_key [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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int session_key_len;
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};
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struct SRPVerifier
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{
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enum hash_alg alg;
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NGConstant *ng;
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const unsigned char *bytes_B;
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int authenticated;
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char *username;
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unsigned char M [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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unsigned char H_AMK [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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unsigned char session_key [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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int session_key_len;
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};
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struct NGHex
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{
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int N_len;
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const char *n_hex;
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const char *g_hex;
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};
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// These constants here were pulled from Appendix A of RFC 5054
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static struct NGHex global_Ng_constants[] =
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{
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{ /* 2048 */
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256,
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"AC6BDB41324A9A9BF166DE5E1389582FAF72B6651987EE07FC3192943DB56050A37329CBB4"
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"A099ED8193E0757767A13DD52312AB4B03310DCD7F48A9DA04FD50E8083969EDB767B0CF60"
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"95179A163AB3661A05FBD5FAAAE82918A9962F0B93B855F97993EC975EEAA80D740ADBF4FF"
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"747359D041D5C33EA71D281E446B14773BCA97B43A23FB801676BD207A436C6481F1D2B907"
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"8717461A5B9D32E688F87748544523B524B0D57D5EA77A2775D2ECFA032CFBDBF52FB37861"
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"60279004E57AE6AF874E7303CE53299CCC041C7BC308D82A5698F3A8D0C38271AE35F8E9DB"
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"FBB694B5C803D89F7AE435DE236D525F54759B65E372FCD68EF20FA7111F9E4AFF73",
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"2"
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},
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{ /* 3072 */
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384,
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"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B"
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"139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485"
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"B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1F"
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"E649286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F83655D23"
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"DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32"
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"905E462E36CE3BE39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9DE2BCBF69558"
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"17183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA051015728E5A8AAAC42DAD33170D04507A33A85521"
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"ABDF1CBA64ECFB850458DBEF0A8AEA71575D060C7DB3970F85A6E1E4C7ABF5AE8CDB0933D7"
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"1E8C94E04A25619DCEE3D2261AD2EE6BF12FFA06D98A0864D87602733EC86A64521F2B1817"
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"7B200CBBE117577A615D6C770988C0BAD946E208E24FA074E5AB3143DB5BFCE0FD108E4B82"
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"D120A93AD2CAFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF",
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"5"
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},
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{0} /* null sentinel */
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};
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static NGConstant *
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new_ng(SRP_NGType ng_type, const char *n_hex, const char *g_hex)
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{
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NGConstant *ng = calloc(1, sizeof(NGConstant));
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if ( ng_type != SRP_NG_CUSTOM )
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{
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n_hex = global_Ng_constants[ng_type].n_hex;
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g_hex = global_Ng_constants[ng_type].g_hex;
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}
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bnum_hex2bn(ng->N, n_hex);
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bnum_hex2bn(ng->g, g_hex);
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ng->N_len = bnum_num_bytes(ng->N);
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assert(ng_type == SRP_NG_CUSTOM || ng->N_len == global_Ng_constants[ng_type].N_len);
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return ng;
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}
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static void
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free_ng(NGConstant * ng)
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{
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if (!ng)
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return;
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bnum_free(ng->N);
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bnum_free(ng->g);
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free(ng);
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}
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static int
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N_len(SRP_NGType ng_type)
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{
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if (ng_type == SRP_NG_CUSTOM)
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return -1;
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return global_Ng_constants[ng_type].N_len;
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}
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static bnum
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calculate_x(enum hash_alg alg, const bnum salt, const char *username, const unsigned char *password, int password_len)
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{
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unsigned char ucp_hash[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
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HashCTX ctx;
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hash_init( alg, &ctx );
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hash_update( alg, &ctx, username, strlen(username) );
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hash_update( alg, &ctx, ":", 1 );
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hash_update( alg, &ctx, password, password_len );
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hash_final( alg, &ctx, ucp_hash );
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return H_ns( alg, salt, ucp_hash, hash_length(alg) );
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}
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static void
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calculate_M(enum hash_alg alg, NGConstant *ng, unsigned char *dest, const char *I, const bnum s,
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const bnum A, const bnum B, const unsigned char *K, int K_len)
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{
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unsigned char H_N[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
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unsigned char H_g[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
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unsigned char H_I[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
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unsigned char H_xor[ SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH ];
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HashCTX ctx;
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int i = 0;
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int hash_len = hash_length(alg);
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hash_num( alg, ng->N, H_N );
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hash_num( alg, ng->g, H_g );
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hash(alg, (const unsigned char *)I, strlen(I), H_I);
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for (i=0; i < hash_len; i++ )
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H_xor[i] = H_N[i] ^ H_g[i];
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hash_init( alg, &ctx );
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hash_update( alg, &ctx, H_xor, hash_len );
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hash_update( alg, &ctx, H_I, hash_len );
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update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, s );
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update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, A );
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update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, B );
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hash_update( alg, &ctx, K, K_len );
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hash_final( alg, &ctx, dest );
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}
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static void
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calculate_H_AMK(enum hash_alg alg, unsigned char *dest, const bnum A, const unsigned char * M, const unsigned char * K, int K_len)
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{
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HashCTX ctx;
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hash_init( alg, &ctx );
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update_hash_n( alg, &ctx, A );
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hash_update( alg, &ctx, M, hash_length(alg) );
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hash_update( alg, &ctx, K, K_len );
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hash_final( alg, &ctx, dest );
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}
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/* ----------------------- SRP for the client side -------------------------- */
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static struct SRPUser *
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srp_user_new(enum hash_alg alg, SRP_NGType ng_type, const char *username,
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const unsigned char *bytes_password, int len_password,
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const char *n_hex, const char *g_hex)
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{
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struct SRPUser *usr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct SRPUser));
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int ulen = strlen(username) + 1;
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if (!usr)
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goto err_exit;
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usr->alg = alg;
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usr->ng = new_ng( ng_type, n_hex, g_hex );
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bnum_new(usr->a);
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bnum_new(usr->A);
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bnum_new(usr->S);
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if (!usr->ng || !usr->a || !usr->A || !usr->S)
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goto err_exit;
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usr->username = malloc(ulen);
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usr->password = malloc(len_password);
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usr->password_len = len_password;
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if (!usr->username || !usr->password)
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goto err_exit;
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memcpy(usr->username, username, ulen);
|
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memcpy(usr->password, bytes_password, len_password);
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|
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usr->authenticated = 0;
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usr->bytes_A = 0;
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|
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return usr;
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|
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err_exit:
|
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if (!usr)
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return NULL;
|
|
|
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bnum_free(usr->a);
|
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bnum_free(usr->A);
|
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bnum_free(usr->S);
|
|
|
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free(usr->username);
|
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if (usr->password)
|
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{
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memset(usr->password, 0, usr->password_len);
|
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free(usr->password);
|
|
}
|
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free(usr);
|
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|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
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srp_user_free(struct SRPUser *usr)
|
|
{
|
|
if(!usr)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
bnum_free(usr->a);
|
|
bnum_free(usr->A);
|
|
bnum_free(usr->S);
|
|
|
|
free_ng(usr->ng);
|
|
|
|
memset(usr->password, 0, usr->password_len);
|
|
|
|
free(usr->username);
|
|
free(usr->password);
|
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free((char *)usr->bytes_A);
|
|
|
|
memset(usr, 0, sizeof(*usr));
|
|
free(usr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
srp_user_is_authenticated(struct SRPUser *usr)
|
|
{
|
|
return usr->authenticated;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const unsigned char *
|
|
srp_user_get_session_key(struct SRPUser *usr, int *key_length)
|
|
{
|
|
if (key_length)
|
|
*key_length = usr->session_key_len;
|
|
return usr->session_key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_SHORT_A
|
|
// This value of "a" will yield a 383 byte A
|
|
static uint8_t short_a[] = {
|
|
0xef, 0xb5, 0x93, 0xf5, 0x03, 0x97, 0x69, 0x8e, 0x15, 0xed, 0xee, 0x5b, 0xf2, 0xf9, 0x23, 0x6c,
|
|
0xf0, 0x59, 0x6c, 0xe2, 0x77, 0xf2, 0x14, 0x16, 0xac, 0x99, 0xfa, 0x31, 0xae, 0x2b, 0xd3, 0x41,
|
|
};
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Output: username, bytes_A, len_A */
|
|
static void
|
|
srp_user_start_authentication(struct SRPUser *usr, const char **username,
|
|
const unsigned char **bytes_A, int *len_A)
|
|
{
|
|
// BN_hex2bn(&(usr->a), "D929DFB605687233C9E9030C2280156D03BDB9FDCF3CCE3BC27D9CCFCB5FF6A1");
|
|
bnum_random(usr->a, 256);
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_SHORT_A
|
|
bnum_bin2bn(usr->a, short_a, sizeof(short_a));
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_PAIR
|
|
bnum_dump("Random value of usr->a:\n", usr->a);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
bnum_modexp(usr->A, usr->ng->g, usr->a, usr->ng->N);
|
|
|
|
*len_A = bnum_num_bytes(usr->A);
|
|
*bytes_A = malloc(*len_A);
|
|
|
|
if (!*bytes_A)
|
|
{
|
|
*len_A = 0;
|
|
*bytes_A = 0;
|
|
*username = 0;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bnum_bn2bin(usr->A, (unsigned char *) *bytes_A, *len_A);
|
|
|
|
usr->bytes_A = *bytes_A;
|
|
*username = usr->username;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Output: bytes_M. Buffer length is SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH */
|
|
static void
|
|
srp_user_process_challenge(struct SRPUser *usr, const unsigned char *bytes_s, int len_s,
|
|
const unsigned char *bytes_B, int len_B,
|
|
const unsigned char **bytes_M, int *len_M )
|
|
{
|
|
bnum s, B, k, v;
|
|
bnum tmp1, tmp2, tmp3;
|
|
bnum u, x;
|
|
|
|
*len_M = 0;
|
|
*bytes_M = NULL;
|
|
|
|
bnum_bin2bn(s, bytes_s, len_s);
|
|
bnum_bin2bn(B, bytes_B, len_B);
|
|
|
|
k = H_nn_pad(usr->alg, usr->ng->N, usr->ng->g, usr->ng->N_len);
|
|
|
|
bnum_new(v);
|
|
bnum_new(tmp1);
|
|
bnum_new(tmp2);
|
|
bnum_new(tmp3);
|
|
|
|
if (!s || !B || !k || !v || !tmp1 || !tmp2 || !tmp3)
|
|
goto cleanup1;
|
|
|
|
u = H_nn_pad(usr->alg, usr->A, B, usr->ng->N_len);
|
|
x = calculate_x(usr->alg, s, usr->username, usr->password, usr->password_len);
|
|
if (!u || !x)
|
|
goto cleanup2;
|
|
|
|
// SRP-6a safety check
|
|
if (!bnum_is_zero(B) && !bnum_is_zero(u))
|
|
{
|
|
bnum_modexp(v, usr->ng->g, x, usr->ng->N);
|
|
|
|
// S = (B - k*(g^x)) ^ (a + ux)
|
|
bnum_mul(tmp1, u, x);
|
|
bnum_add(tmp2, usr->a, tmp1); // tmp2 = (a + ux)
|
|
bnum_modexp(tmp1, usr->ng->g, x, usr->ng->N);
|
|
bnum_mul(tmp3, k, tmp1); // tmp3 = k*(g^x)
|
|
bnum_sub(tmp1, B, tmp3); // tmp1 = (B - K*(g^x))
|
|
bnum_modexp(usr->S, tmp1, tmp2, usr->ng->N);
|
|
|
|
hash_num(usr->alg, usr->S, usr->session_key);
|
|
usr->session_key_len = hash_length(usr->alg);
|
|
|
|
calculate_M(usr->alg, usr->ng, usr->M, usr->username, s, usr->A, B, usr->session_key, usr->session_key_len);
|
|
calculate_H_AMK(usr->alg, usr->H_AMK, usr->A, usr->M, usr->session_key, usr->session_key_len);
|
|
|
|
*bytes_M = usr->M;
|
|
*len_M = hash_length(usr->alg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cleanup2:
|
|
bnum_free(x);
|
|
bnum_free(u);
|
|
cleanup1:
|
|
bnum_free(tmp3);
|
|
bnum_free(tmp2);
|
|
bnum_free(tmp1);
|
|
bnum_free(v);
|
|
bnum_free(k);
|
|
bnum_free(B);
|
|
bnum_free(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
srp_user_verify_session(struct SRPUser *usr, const unsigned char *bytes_HAMK)
|
|
{
|
|
if (memcmp(usr->H_AMK, bytes_HAMK, hash_length(usr->alg)) == 0)
|
|
usr->authenticated = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ----------------------- SRP for the server side -------------------------- */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
srp_create_salted_verification_key(enum hash_alg alg,
|
|
SRP_NGType ng_type, const char *username,
|
|
const unsigned char *password, int len_password,
|
|
unsigned char **bytes_s, int *len_s,
|
|
unsigned char **bytes_v, int *len_v,
|
|
const char *n_hex, const char *g_hex )
|
|
{
|
|
bnum s, v, x;
|
|
NGConstant *ng;
|
|
|
|
bnum_new(s);
|
|
bnum_new(v);
|
|
x = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ng = new_ng(ng_type, n_hex, g_hex);
|
|
|
|
*bytes_s = NULL;
|
|
*bytes_v = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!s || !v || !ng)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
bnum_random(s, 128); // MODIFIED from csrp's BN_rand(s, 32, -1, 0)
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_PAIR
|
|
bnum_dump("Random value of s:\n", s);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
x = calculate_x(alg, s, username, password, len_password);
|
|
if (!x)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
bnum_modexp(v, ng->g, x, ng->N);
|
|
|
|
*len_s = bnum_num_bytes(s);
|
|
*len_v = bnum_num_bytes(v);
|
|
|
|
*bytes_s = malloc(*len_s);
|
|
*bytes_v = malloc(*len_v);
|
|
if (!(*bytes_s) || !(*bytes_v))
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
bnum_bn2bin(s, (unsigned char *) *bytes_s, *len_s);
|
|
bnum_bn2bin(v, (unsigned char *) *bytes_v, *len_v);
|
|
|
|
free_ng(ng);
|
|
bnum_free(s);
|
|
bnum_free(v);
|
|
bnum_free(x);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
free(*bytes_s);
|
|
free(*bytes_v);
|
|
free_ng(ng);
|
|
bnum_free(s);
|
|
bnum_free(v);
|
|
bnum_free(x);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
srp_verifier_start_authentication(enum hash_alg alg, SRP_NGType ng_type,
|
|
const unsigned char *bytes_v, int len_v,
|
|
unsigned char **bytes_b, int *len_b,
|
|
unsigned char **bytes_B, int *len_B,
|
|
const char *n_hex, const char *g_hex)
|
|
{
|
|
bnum v, k, b, B, tmp1, tmp2;
|
|
NGConstant *ng;
|
|
|
|
v = NULL;
|
|
k = NULL;
|
|
bnum_new(b);
|
|
bnum_new(B);
|
|
bnum_new(tmp1);
|
|
bnum_new(tmp2);
|
|
|
|
*len_b = 0;
|
|
*bytes_b = NULL;
|
|
*len_B = 0;
|
|
*bytes_B = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ng = new_ng(ng_type, n_hex, g_hex);
|
|
|
|
if (!b || !B || !tmp1 || !tmp2 || !ng)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
bnum_bin2bn(v, bytes_v, len_v);
|
|
|
|
bnum_random(b, 256); // MODIFIED from BN_rand(b, 256, -1, 0)
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_PAIR
|
|
bnum_dump("Random value of b:\n", b);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
k = H_nn_pad(alg, ng->N, ng->g, ng->N_len); // MODIFIED from H_nn(alg, ng->N, ng->g)
|
|
if (!k)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
// B = kv + g^b
|
|
bnum_mul(tmp1, k, v);
|
|
bnum_modexp(tmp2, ng->g, b, ng->N);
|
|
bnum_modadd(B, tmp1, tmp2, ng->N);
|
|
|
|
*len_B = bnum_num_bytes(B);
|
|
*len_b = bnum_num_bytes(b);
|
|
|
|
*bytes_B = malloc(*len_B);
|
|
*bytes_b = malloc(*len_b);
|
|
if (!(*bytes_B) || !(*bytes_b))
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
bnum_bn2bin(B, (unsigned char *) *bytes_B, *len_B);
|
|
bnum_bn2bin(b, (unsigned char *) *bytes_b, *len_b);
|
|
|
|
bnum_free(b);
|
|
bnum_free(B);
|
|
bnum_free(v);
|
|
bnum_free(k);
|
|
bnum_free(tmp1);
|
|
bnum_free(tmp2);
|
|
free_ng(ng);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
free(*bytes_B);
|
|
free(*bytes_b);
|
|
bnum_free(b);
|
|
bnum_free(B);
|
|
bnum_free(v);
|
|
bnum_free(k);
|
|
bnum_free(tmp1);
|
|
bnum_free(tmp2);
|
|
free_ng(ng);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
srp_verifier_free(struct SRPVerifier *ver)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ver)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
free_ng(ver->ng);
|
|
|
|
free(ver->username);
|
|
|
|
memset(ver, 0, sizeof(struct SRPVerifier));
|
|
free(ver);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct SRPVerifier *
|
|
srp_verifier_new(enum hash_alg alg, SRP_NGType ng_type, const char *username,
|
|
const unsigned char *bytes_s, int len_s,
|
|
const unsigned char *bytes_v, int len_v,
|
|
const unsigned char *bytes_A, int len_A,
|
|
const unsigned char *bytes_b, int len_b,
|
|
const unsigned char *bytes_B, int len_B,
|
|
const char *n_hex, const char *g_hex )
|
|
{
|
|
struct SRPVerifier *ver = NULL;
|
|
bnum s, v, A, b, B, S, tmp1, tmp2, u, k;
|
|
NGConstant *ng;
|
|
size_t ulen;
|
|
|
|
bnum_bin2bn(s, bytes_s, len_s);
|
|
bnum_bin2bn(v, bytes_v, len_v);
|
|
bnum_bin2bn(A, bytes_A, len_A);
|
|
bnum_bin2bn(b, bytes_b, len_b);
|
|
bnum_bin2bn(B, bytes_B, len_B);
|
|
bnum_new(S);
|
|
bnum_new(tmp1);
|
|
bnum_new(tmp2);
|
|
u = NULL;
|
|
k = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ng = new_ng(ng_type, n_hex, g_hex);
|
|
|
|
if (!s || !v || !A || !B || !S || !b || !tmp1 || !tmp2 || !ng)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
ver = calloc(1, sizeof(struct SRPVerifier));
|
|
if (!ver)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
ulen = strlen(username) + 1;
|
|
|
|
ver->alg = alg;
|
|
ver->ng = ng;
|
|
|
|
ver->username = malloc(ulen);
|
|
if (!ver->username)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(ver->username, username, ulen);
|
|
|
|
ver->authenticated = 0;
|
|
|
|
// SRP-6a safety check
|
|
bnum_mod(tmp1, A, ng->N);
|
|
if (bnum_is_zero(tmp1))
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
k = H_nn_pad(alg, ng->N, ng->g, ng->N_len); // MODIFIED from H_nn(alg, ng->N, ng->g)
|
|
u = H_nn_pad(alg, A, B, ng->N_len); // MODIFIED from H_nn(alg, A, B)
|
|
|
|
// S = (A *(v^u)) ^ b
|
|
bnum_modexp(tmp1, v, u, ng->N);
|
|
bnum_mul(tmp2, A, tmp1);
|
|
bnum_modexp(S, tmp2, b, ng->N);
|
|
|
|
hash_num(alg, S, ver->session_key);
|
|
ver->session_key_len = hash_length(ver->alg);
|
|
|
|
calculate_M(alg, ng, ver->M, username, s, A, B, ver->session_key, ver->session_key_len);
|
|
calculate_H_AMK(alg, ver->H_AMK, A, ver->M, ver->session_key, ver->session_key_len);
|
|
|
|
ver->bytes_B = bytes_B;
|
|
|
|
bnum_free(s);
|
|
bnum_free(v);
|
|
bnum_free(A);
|
|
bnum_free(u);
|
|
bnum_free(k);
|
|
bnum_free(B);
|
|
bnum_free(S);
|
|
bnum_free(b);
|
|
bnum_free(tmp1);
|
|
bnum_free(tmp2);
|
|
return ver;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
srp_verifier_free(ver);
|
|
bnum_free(s);
|
|
bnum_free(v);
|
|
bnum_free(A);
|
|
bnum_free(u);
|
|
bnum_free(k);
|
|
bnum_free(B);
|
|
bnum_free(S);
|
|
bnum_free(b);
|
|
bnum_free(tmp1);
|
|
bnum_free(tmp2);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// user_M must be exactly SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes in size
|
|
static void
|
|
srp_verifier_verify_session(struct SRPVerifier *ver, const unsigned char *user_M, const unsigned char **bytes_HAMK)
|
|
{
|
|
if (memcmp(ver->M, user_M, hash_length(ver->alg)) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ver->authenticated = 1;
|
|
*bytes_HAMK = ver->H_AMK;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
*bytes_HAMK = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const unsigned char *
|
|
srp_verifier_get_session_key(struct SRPVerifier *ver, int *key_length)
|
|
{
|
|
if (key_length)
|
|
*key_length = hash_length(ver->alg);
|
|
|
|
return ver->session_key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* -------------------------------- HELPERS --------------------------------- */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
hexread(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len, const char *in)
|
|
{
|
|
char hex[] = { 0, 0, 0 };
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++, in+=2)
|
|
{
|
|
hex[0] = in[0];
|
|
hex[1] = in[1];
|
|
out[i] = strtol(hex, NULL, 16);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static pair_tlv_values_t *
|
|
message_process(const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len, const char **errmsg)
|
|
{
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *response;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *error;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
response = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
if (!response)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Out of memory\n";
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_parse(data, data_len, response);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Could not parse TLV\n";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_PAIR
|
|
pair_tlv_debug(response);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
error = pair_tlv_get_value(response, TLVType_Error);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
{
|
|
if (error->value[0] == TLVError_Authentication)
|
|
*errmsg = "Device returned an authentication failure";
|
|
else if (error->value[0] == TLVError_Backoff)
|
|
*errmsg = "Device told us to back off pairing attempts\n";
|
|
else if (error->value[0] == TLVError_MaxPeers)
|
|
*errmsg = "Max peers trying to connect to device\n";
|
|
else if (error->value[0] == TLVError_MaxTries)
|
|
*errmsg = "Max pairing attempts reached\n";
|
|
else if (error->value[0] == TLVError_Unavailable)
|
|
*errmsg = "Device is unuavailble at this time\n";
|
|
else
|
|
*errmsg = "Device is busy/returned unknown error\n";
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return response;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Executes SHA512 RFC 5869 extract + expand, writing a derived key to okm
|
|
|
|
hkdfExtract(SHA512, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk);
|
|
hkdfExpand(SHA512, prk, SHA512_LEN, info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
|
|
|
|
add an explicit salt value to allow for a unique salt to be given at initialisation
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
hkdf_extract_expand_with_salt_and_info(uint8_t *okm, size_t okm_len, const uint8_t *ikm, size_t ikm_len, const char *salt, const char *info)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_OPENSSL
|
|
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
|
|
|
|
if (okm_len > SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
if (! (pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_HKDF, NULL)))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(pctx, EVP_sha512()) <= 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt(pctx, salt, strlen(salt)) <= 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key(pctx, ikm, ikm_len) <= 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info(pctx, info, strlen(info)) <= 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, okm, &okm_len) <= 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#elif CONFIG_GCRYPT
|
|
uint8_t prk[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
|
gcry_md_hd_t hmac_handle;
|
|
|
|
if (okm_len > SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)
|
|
return -1; // Below calculation not valid if output is larger than hash size
|
|
if (gcry_md_open(&hmac_handle, GCRY_MD_SHA512, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
if (gcry_md_setkey(hmac_handle, salt, strlen(salt)) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
gcry_md_write(hmac_handle, ikm, ikm_len);
|
|
memcpy(prk, gcry_md_read(hmac_handle, 0), sizeof(prk));
|
|
|
|
gcry_md_reset(hmac_handle);
|
|
|
|
if (gcry_md_setkey(hmac_handle, prk, sizeof(prk)) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
gcry_md_write(hmac_handle, info, strlen(info));
|
|
gcry_md_putc(hmac_handle, 1);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(okm, gcry_md_read(hmac_handle, 0), okm_len);
|
|
|
|
gcry_md_close(hmac_handle);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
gcry_md_close(hmac_handle);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#else
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Executes SHA512 RFC 5869 extract + expand, writing a derived key to okm
|
|
|
|
hkdfExtract(SHA512, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk);
|
|
hkdfExpand(SHA512, prk, SHA512_LEN, info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
hkdf_extract_expand(uint8_t *okm, size_t okm_len, const uint8_t *ikm, size_t ikm_len, enum pair_keys pair_key) {
|
|
// pass in the salt that is in the pair_key_maps table
|
|
return hkdf_extract_expand_with_salt_and_info(okm, okm_len, ikm, ikm_len, pair_keys_map[pair_key].salt, pair_keys_map[pair_key].info);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
encrypt_chacha(uint8_t *cipher, const uint8_t *plain, size_t plain_len, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, const void *ad, size_t ad_len, uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_len, const uint8_t nonce[NONCE_LENGTH])
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_OPENSSL
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
if (! (ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_chacha20_poly1305(), NULL, key, nonce) != 1)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0) != 1) // Maybe not necessary
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (ad_len > 0 && EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &len, ad, ad_len) != 1)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, cipher, &len, plain, plain_len) != 1)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
assert(len == plain_len);
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, NULL, &len) != 1)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, tag_len, tag) != 1)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#elif CONFIG_GCRYPT
|
|
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
|
|
|
|
if (gcry_cipher_open(&hd, GCRY_CIPHER_CHACHA20, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_POLY1305, 0) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (gcry_cipher_setkey(hd, key, key_len) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (gcry_cipher_setiv(hd, nonce, NONCE_LENGTH) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (ad_len > 0 && gcry_cipher_authenticate(hd, ad, ad_len) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (gcry_cipher_encrypt(hd, cipher, plain_len, plain, plain_len) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (gcry_cipher_gettag(hd, tag, tag_len) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
gcry_cipher_close(hd);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
gcry_cipher_close(hd);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#else
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
decrypt_chacha(uint8_t *plain, const uint8_t *cipher, size_t cipher_len, const uint8_t *key, size_t key_len, const void *ad, size_t ad_len, uint8_t *tag, size_t tag_len, const uint8_t nonce[NONCE_LENGTH])
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_OPENSSL
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
if (! (ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_chacha20_poly1305(), NULL, key, nonce) != 1)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0) != 1) // Maybe not necessary
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, tag_len, tag) != 1)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (ad_len > 0 && EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &len, ad, ad_len) != 1)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, plain, &len, cipher, cipher_len) != 1)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, NULL, &len) != 1)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#elif CONFIG_GCRYPT
|
|
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
|
|
|
|
if (gcry_cipher_open(&hd, GCRY_CIPHER_CHACHA20, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_POLY1305, 0) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (gcry_cipher_setkey(hd, key, key_len) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (gcry_cipher_setiv(hd, nonce, NONCE_LENGTH) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (ad_len > 0 && gcry_cipher_authenticate(hd, ad, ad_len) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (gcry_cipher_decrypt(hd, plain, cipher_len, cipher, cipher_len) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
if (gcry_cipher_checktag(hd, tag, tag_len) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
gcry_cipher_close(hd);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
gcry_cipher_close(hd);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#else
|
|
return -1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
create_info(uint8_t *info, size_t *info_len, uint8_t *a, size_t a_len, uint8_t *b, size_t b_len, uint8_t *c, size_t c_len)
|
|
{
|
|
if (a_len + b_len + c_len > *info_len)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
*info_len = a_len + b_len + c_len;
|
|
memcpy(info, a, a_len);
|
|
memcpy(info + a_len, b, b_len);
|
|
memcpy(info + a_len + b_len, c, c_len);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
create_and_sign_device_info(uint8_t *msg, size_t *msg_len, const char *device_id, uint8_t *device_x, size_t device_x_len, uint8_t *pk, size_t pk_len, uint8_t *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *tlv;
|
|
uint8_t device_info[256];
|
|
size_t device_info_len;
|
|
size_t device_id_len;
|
|
uint8_t signature[crypto_sign_BYTES];
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
device_id_len = strlen(device_id);
|
|
device_info_len = sizeof(device_info);
|
|
|
|
ret = create_info(device_info, &device_info_len, device_x, device_x_len, (uint8_t *)device_id, device_id_len, pk, pk_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
crypto_sign_detached(signature, NULL, device_info, device_info_len, sk);
|
|
|
|
tlv = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(tlv, TLVType_Identifier, (unsigned char *)device_id, device_id_len);
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(tlv, TLVType_Signature, signature, sizeof(signature));
|
|
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(tlv, msg, msg_len);
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(tlv);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
create_and_sign_accessory_info(uint8_t *msg, size_t *msg_len, uint8_t *server_pk, size_t server_pk_len, const char *accessory_id, uint8_t *client_pk, size_t client_pk_len, uint8_t *sk)
|
|
{
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *tlv;
|
|
uint8_t accessory_info[256];
|
|
size_t accessory_info_len;
|
|
size_t accessory_id_len;
|
|
uint8_t signature[crypto_sign_BYTES];
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
accessory_id_len = strlen(accessory_id);
|
|
accessory_info_len = sizeof(accessory_info);
|
|
|
|
ret = create_info(accessory_info, &accessory_info_len, server_pk, server_pk_len, (uint8_t *)accessory_id, accessory_id_len, client_pk, client_pk_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
crypto_sign_detached(signature, NULL, accessory_info, accessory_info_len, sk);
|
|
|
|
tlv = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(tlv, TLVType_Identifier, (unsigned char *)accessory_id, accessory_id_len);
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(tlv, TLVType_Signature, signature, sizeof(signature));
|
|
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(tlv, msg, msg_len);
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(tlv);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
verify_info(uint8_t *signature, uint8_t *pk, uint8_t *a, size_t a_len, uint8_t *b, size_t b_len, uint8_t *c, size_t c_len)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t info[256];
|
|
size_t info_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
info_len = sizeof(info);
|
|
ret = create_info(info, &info_len, a, a_len, b, b_len, c, c_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return crypto_sign_verify_detached(signature, info, info_len, pk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ------------------------- CLIENT IMPLEMENTATION -------------------------- */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
client_setup_new(struct pair_setup_context *handle, const char *pin, pair_cb add_cb, void *cb_arg, const char *device_id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_client_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.client;
|
|
|
|
if (!is_initialized())
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (!pin && handle->type == &pair_client_homekit_transient)
|
|
pin = "3939";
|
|
else if (!pin)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (device_id && strlen(device_id) >= PAIR_AP_DEVICE_ID_LEN_MAX)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
sctx->pin = strdup(pin);
|
|
if (!sctx->pin)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
sctx->add_cb = add_cb;
|
|
sctx->add_cb_arg = cb_arg;
|
|
|
|
if (device_id)
|
|
memcpy(sctx->device_id, device_id, strlen(device_id));
|
|
|
|
crypto_sign_keypair(sctx->public_key, sctx->private_key);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_PAIR
|
|
hexdump("Client public key:\n", sctx->public_key, sizeof(sctx->public_key));
|
|
hexdump("Client private key:\n", sctx->private_key, sizeof(sctx->private_key));
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
client_setup_free(struct pair_setup_context *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_client_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.client;
|
|
|
|
srp_user_free(sctx->user);
|
|
|
|
free(sctx->pkB);
|
|
free(sctx->M2);
|
|
free(sctx->salt);
|
|
free(sctx->epk);
|
|
free(sctx->authtag);
|
|
free(sctx->pin);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint8_t *
|
|
client_setup_request1(size_t *len, struct pair_setup_context *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_client_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.client;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *request;
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
size_t data_len;
|
|
uint8_t method;
|
|
uint8_t flags;
|
|
int endian_test = 1;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE;
|
|
data = malloc(data_len);
|
|
request = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
|
|
// Test here instead of setup_new() so we can give an error message
|
|
if(*(char *)&endian_test != 1)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup request 1: No support for big endian architechture";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sctx->user = srp_user_new(HASH_SHA512, SRP_NG_3072, USERNAME, (unsigned char *)sctx->pin, strlen(sctx->pin), 0, 0);
|
|
if (!sctx->user)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup request 1: Create SRP user failed";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
method = PairingMethodPairSetup;
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(request, TLVType_State, &pair_keys_map[PAIR_SETUP_MSG01].state, sizeof(pair_keys_map[PAIR_SETUP_MSG01].state));
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(request, TLVType_Method, &method, sizeof(method));
|
|
|
|
if (handle->type == &pair_client_homekit_transient)
|
|
{
|
|
flags = PairingFlagsTransient;
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(request, TLVType_Flags, &flags, sizeof(flags));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(request, data, &data_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup request 1: pair_tlv_format returned an error";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*len = data_len;
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return data;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
free(data);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint8_t *
|
|
client_setup_request2(size_t *len, struct pair_setup_context *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_client_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.client;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *request;
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
size_t data_len;
|
|
const char *auth_username = NULL;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE;
|
|
data = malloc(data_len);
|
|
request = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
|
|
// Calculate A
|
|
srp_user_start_authentication(sctx->user, &auth_username, &sctx->pkA, &sctx->pkA_len);
|
|
|
|
// Calculate M1 (client proof)
|
|
srp_user_process_challenge(sctx->user, (const unsigned char *)sctx->salt, sctx->salt_len, (const unsigned char *)sctx->pkB, sctx->pkB_len, &sctx->M1, &sctx->M1_len);
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(request, TLVType_State, &pair_keys_map[PAIR_SETUP_MSG03].state, sizeof(pair_keys_map[PAIR_SETUP_MSG03].state));
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(request, TLVType_PublicKey, sctx->pkA, sctx->pkA_len);
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(request, TLVType_Proof, sctx->M1, sctx->M1_len);
|
|
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(request, data, &data_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup request 2: pair_tlv_format returned an error";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*len = data_len;
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return data;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
free(data);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint8_t *
|
|
client_setup_request3(size_t *len, struct pair_setup_context *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_client_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.client;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *request;
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
size_t data_len;
|
|
const unsigned char *session_key;
|
|
int session_key_len;
|
|
uint8_t device_x[32];
|
|
uint8_t nonce[NONCE_LENGTH] = { 0 };
|
|
uint8_t tag[AUTHTAG_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t derived_key[32];
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *append;
|
|
size_t append_len;
|
|
uint8_t *encrypted_data = NULL;
|
|
size_t encrypted_data_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE;
|
|
data = malloc(data_len);
|
|
request = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
|
|
session_key = srp_user_get_session_key(sctx->user, &session_key_len);
|
|
if (!session_key)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup request 3: No valid session key";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = hkdf_extract_expand(device_x, sizeof(device_x), session_key, session_key_len, PAIR_SETUP_CONTROLLER_SIGN);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup request 3: hkdf error getting device_x";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = create_and_sign_device_info(data, &data_len, sctx->device_id, device_x, sizeof(device_x), sctx->public_key, sizeof(sctx->public_key), sctx->private_key);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup request 3: error creating signed device info";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = hkdf_extract_expand(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), session_key, session_key_len, PAIR_SETUP_MSG05);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup request 3: hkdf error getting derived_key";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Append TLV-encoded public key to *data, which already has identifier and signature
|
|
append = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
append_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE - data_len;
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(append, TLVType_PublicKey, sctx->public_key, sizeof(sctx->public_key));
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(append, data + data_len, &append_len);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(append);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup request 3: error appending public key to TLV";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
data_len += append_len;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(nonce + 4, pair_keys_map[PAIR_SETUP_MSG05].nonce, NONCE_LENGTH - 4);
|
|
|
|
encrypted_data_len = data_len + sizeof(tag); // Space for ciphered payload and authtag
|
|
encrypted_data = malloc(encrypted_data_len);
|
|
|
|
ret = encrypt_chacha(encrypted_data, data, data_len, derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), NULL, 0, tag, sizeof(tag), nonce);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup request 3: Could not encrypt";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(encrypted_data + data_len, tag, sizeof(tag));
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(request, TLVType_State, &pair_keys_map[PAIR_SETUP_MSG05].state, sizeof(pair_keys_map[PAIR_SETUP_MSG05].state));
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(request, TLVType_EncryptedData, encrypted_data, encrypted_data_len);
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE; // Re-using *data, so pass original length to pair_tlv_format
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(request, data, &data_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup request 3: error appending public key to TLV";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*len = data_len;
|
|
|
|
free(encrypted_data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return data;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
free(encrypted_data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
free(data);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
client_setup_response1(struct pair_setup_context *handle, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_client_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.client;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *response;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *pk;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *salt;
|
|
|
|
response = message_process(data, data_len, &handle->errmsg);
|
|
if (!response)
|
|
{
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pk = pair_tlv_get_value(response, TLVType_PublicKey);
|
|
if (!pk || pk->size > N_len(SRP_NG_3072)) // max 384 bytes
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup response 1: Missing or invalid public key";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
salt = pair_tlv_get_value(response, TLVType_Salt);
|
|
if (!salt || salt->size != 16)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup response 1: Missing or invalid salt";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sctx->pkB_len = pk->size;
|
|
sctx->pkB = malloc(sctx->pkB_len);
|
|
memcpy(sctx->pkB, pk->value, sctx->pkB_len);
|
|
|
|
sctx->salt_len = salt->size;
|
|
sctx->salt = malloc(sctx->salt_len);
|
|
memcpy(sctx->salt, salt->value, sctx->salt_len);
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
client_setup_response2(struct pair_setup_context *handle, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_client_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.client;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *response;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *proof;
|
|
const uint8_t *session_key;
|
|
int session_key_len;
|
|
|
|
response = message_process(data, data_len, &handle->errmsg);
|
|
if (!response)
|
|
{
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
proof = pair_tlv_get_value(response, TLVType_Proof);
|
|
if (!proof || proof->size != SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup response 2: Missing or invalid proof";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sctx->M2_len = proof->size;
|
|
sctx->M2 = malloc(sctx->M2_len);
|
|
memcpy(sctx->M2, proof->value, sctx->M2_len);
|
|
|
|
// Check M2
|
|
srp_user_verify_session(sctx->user, (const unsigned char *)sctx->M2);
|
|
if (!srp_user_is_authenticated(sctx->user))
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup response 2: Server authentication failed";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (handle->type == &pair_client_homekit_transient)
|
|
{
|
|
session_key = srp_user_get_session_key(sctx->user, &session_key_len);
|
|
if (!session_key)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup response 2: Could not compute session key";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(sizeof(handle->result.shared_secret) >= session_key_len);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(handle->result.shared_secret, session_key, session_key_len);
|
|
handle->result.shared_secret_len = session_key_len;
|
|
|
|
handle->status = PAIR_STATUS_COMPLETED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
client_setup_response3(struct pair_setup_context *handle, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_client_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.client;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *response;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *encrypted_data;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *device_id;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *pk;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *signature;
|
|
uint8_t nonce[NONCE_LENGTH] = { 0 };
|
|
uint8_t tag[AUTHTAG_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t derived_key[32];
|
|
size_t encrypted_len;
|
|
uint8_t *decrypted_data = NULL;
|
|
const uint8_t *session_key;
|
|
int session_key_len;
|
|
uint8_t device_x[32];
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
response = message_process(data, data_len, &handle->errmsg);
|
|
if (!response)
|
|
{
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encrypted_data = pair_tlv_get_value(response, TLVType_EncryptedData);
|
|
if (!encrypted_data)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup response 3: Missing encrypted_data";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
session_key = srp_user_get_session_key(sctx->user, &session_key_len);
|
|
if (!session_key)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup response 3: No valid session key";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = hkdf_extract_expand(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), session_key, session_key_len, PAIR_SETUP_MSG06);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup response 3: hkdf error getting derived_key";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// encrypted_data->value consists of the encrypted payload + the auth tag
|
|
if (encrypted_data->size < AUTHTAG_LENGTH)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup response 3: Invalid encrypted data";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encrypted_len = encrypted_data->size - AUTHTAG_LENGTH;
|
|
memcpy(tag, encrypted_data->value + encrypted_len, AUTHTAG_LENGTH);
|
|
memcpy(nonce + 4, pair_keys_map[PAIR_SETUP_MSG06].nonce, NONCE_LENGTH - 4);
|
|
|
|
decrypted_data = malloc(encrypted_len);
|
|
|
|
ret = decrypt_chacha(decrypted_data, encrypted_data->value, encrypted_len, derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), NULL, 0, tag, sizeof(tag), nonce);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup response 3: Decryption error";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
response = message_process(decrypted_data, encrypted_len, &handle->errmsg);
|
|
if (!response)
|
|
{
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = hkdf_extract_expand(device_x, sizeof(device_x), session_key, session_key_len, PAIR_SETUP_ACCESSORY_SIGN);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup response 3: hkdf error getting device_x";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
device_id = pair_tlv_get_value(response, TLVType_Identifier);
|
|
pk = pair_tlv_get_value(response, TLVType_PublicKey);
|
|
signature = pair_tlv_get_value(response, TLVType_Signature);
|
|
if (!device_id || device_id->size >= sizeof(handle->result.device_id) || !pk || pk->size != crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES || !signature || signature->size != crypto_sign_BYTES)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup response 3: Missing/invalid device ID, public key or signature";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = verify_info(signature->value, pk->value, device_x, sizeof(device_x), device_id->value, device_id->size, pk->value, pk->size);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Setup request 3: Invalid signature";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(sizeof(handle->result.client_private_key) == sizeof(sctx->private_key));
|
|
assert(sizeof(handle->result.client_public_key) == sizeof(sctx->public_key));
|
|
assert(sizeof(handle->result.server_public_key) == pk->size);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(handle->result.client_private_key, sctx->private_key, sizeof(sctx->private_key));
|
|
memcpy(handle->result.client_public_key, sctx->public_key, sizeof(sctx->public_key));
|
|
memcpy(handle->result.server_public_key, pk->value, pk->size);
|
|
memcpy(handle->result.device_id, device_id->value, device_id->size);
|
|
|
|
if (sctx->add_cb)
|
|
sctx->add_cb(handle->result.server_public_key, handle->result.device_id, sctx->add_cb_arg);
|
|
|
|
handle->status = PAIR_STATUS_COMPLETED;
|
|
|
|
free(decrypted_data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
free(decrypted_data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
client_setup_result(struct pair_setup_context *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
char *ptr;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
assert(sizeof(handle->result_str) >= 2 * sizeof(handle->result.client_private_key) + 2 * sizeof(handle->result.server_public_key) + 1);
|
|
|
|
// It is enough to export the private key, since the public key can be
|
|
// extracted from that with crypto_sign_ed25519_sk_to_pk (it is the last 32
|
|
// bytes)
|
|
ptr = handle->result_str;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(handle->result.client_private_key); i++)
|
|
ptr += sprintf(ptr, "%02x", handle->result.client_private_key[i]); // 2 x 64 bytes
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(handle->result.server_public_key); i++)
|
|
ptr += sprintf(ptr, "%02x", handle->result.server_public_key[i]); // 2 x 32 bytes
|
|
*ptr = '\0';
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
client_verify_new(struct pair_verify_context *handle, const char *client_setup_keys, pair_cb cb, void *cb_arg, const char *device_id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_client_verify_context *vctx = &handle->vctx.client;
|
|
size_t hexkey_len;
|
|
|
|
if (!is_initialized())
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (!device_id || strlen(device_id) >= PAIR_AP_DEVICE_ID_LEN_MAX)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (!client_setup_keys)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
hexkey_len = strlen(client_setup_keys);
|
|
if (hexkey_len == 2 * sizeof(vctx->client_private_key) + 2 * sizeof(vctx->server_public_key))
|
|
{
|
|
hexread(vctx->client_private_key, sizeof(vctx->client_private_key), client_setup_keys);
|
|
hexread(vctx->server_public_key, sizeof(vctx->server_public_key), client_setup_keys + 2 * sizeof(vctx->client_private_key));
|
|
vctx->verify_server_signature = true;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (hexkey_len == 2 * sizeof(vctx->client_private_key)) // No server public key known, so signature validation will be skipped
|
|
{
|
|
hexread(vctx->client_private_key, sizeof(vctx->client_private_key), client_setup_keys);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
crypto_sign_ed25519_sk_to_pk(vctx->client_public_key, vctx->client_private_key);
|
|
|
|
snprintf(vctx->device_id, sizeof(vctx->device_id), "%s", device_id);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint8_t *
|
|
client_verify_request1(size_t *len, struct pair_verify_context *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_client_verify_context *vctx = &handle->vctx.client;
|
|
// const uint8_t basepoint[crypto_scalarmult_BYTES] = {9}; // 32 bytes
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *request;
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
size_t data_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE;
|
|
data = malloc(data_len);
|
|
request = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
|
|
crypto_box_keypair(vctx->client_eph_public_key, vctx->client_eph_private_key);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
// TODO keep around in case box_keypair doesn't work
|
|
ret = crypto_scalarmult(vctx->client_eph_public_key, vctx->client_eph_private_key, basepoint);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Verify request 1: Curve 25519 returned an error";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(request, TLVType_State, &pair_keys_map[PAIR_VERIFY_MSG01].state, sizeof(pair_keys_map[PAIR_VERIFY_MSG01].state));
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(request, TLVType_PublicKey, vctx->client_eph_public_key, sizeof(vctx->client_eph_public_key));
|
|
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(request, data, &data_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Verify request 1: pair_tlv_format returned an error";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*len = data_len;
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return data;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
free(data);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint8_t *
|
|
client_verify_request2(size_t *len, struct pair_verify_context *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_client_verify_context *vctx = &handle->vctx.client;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *request;
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
size_t data_len;
|
|
uint8_t nonce[NONCE_LENGTH] = { 0 };
|
|
uint8_t tag[AUTHTAG_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t derived_key[32];
|
|
uint8_t *encrypted_data = NULL;
|
|
size_t encrypted_data_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE;
|
|
data = malloc(data_len);
|
|
request = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
|
|
ret = create_and_sign_device_info(data, &data_len, vctx->device_id, vctx->client_eph_public_key, sizeof(vctx->client_eph_public_key),
|
|
vctx->server_eph_public_key, sizeof(vctx->server_eph_public_key), vctx->client_private_key);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Verify request 2: error creating signed device info";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = hkdf_extract_expand(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), vctx->shared_secret, sizeof(vctx->shared_secret), PAIR_VERIFY_MSG03);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Verify request 2: hkdf error getting derived_key";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(nonce + 4, pair_keys_map[PAIR_VERIFY_MSG03].nonce, NONCE_LENGTH - 4);
|
|
|
|
encrypted_data_len = data_len + sizeof(tag); // Space for ciphered payload and authtag
|
|
encrypted_data = malloc(encrypted_data_len);
|
|
|
|
ret = encrypt_chacha(encrypted_data, data, data_len, derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), NULL, 0, tag, sizeof(tag), nonce);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Verify request 2: Could not encrypt";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(encrypted_data + data_len, tag, sizeof(tag));
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(request, TLVType_State, &pair_keys_map[PAIR_VERIFY_MSG03].state, sizeof(pair_keys_map[PAIR_VERIFY_MSG03].state));
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(request, TLVType_EncryptedData, encrypted_data, encrypted_data_len);
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE; // Re-using *data, so pass original length to pair_tlv_format
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(request, data, &data_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Verify request 2: pair_tlv_format returned an error";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*len = data_len;
|
|
|
|
free(encrypted_data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return data;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
free(encrypted_data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
free(data);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
client_verify_response1(struct pair_verify_context *handle, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_client_verify_context *vctx = &handle->vctx.client;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *response;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *encrypted_data;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *public_key;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *device_id;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *signature;
|
|
uint8_t nonce[NONCE_LENGTH] = { 0 };
|
|
uint8_t tag[AUTHTAG_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t derived_key[32];
|
|
size_t encrypted_len;
|
|
uint8_t *decrypted_data = NULL;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
response = message_process(data, data_len, &handle->errmsg);
|
|
if (!response)
|
|
{
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encrypted_data = pair_tlv_get_value(response, TLVType_EncryptedData);
|
|
if (!encrypted_data)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Verify response 1: Missing encrypted_data";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
public_key = pair_tlv_get_value(response, TLVType_PublicKey);
|
|
if (!public_key || public_key->size != sizeof(vctx->server_eph_public_key))
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Verify response 1: Missing or invalid public_key";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(vctx->server_eph_public_key, public_key->value, sizeof(vctx->server_eph_public_key));
|
|
ret = crypto_scalarmult(vctx->shared_secret, vctx->client_eph_private_key, vctx->server_eph_public_key);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Verify response 1: Curve 25519 returned an error";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = hkdf_extract_expand(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), vctx->shared_secret, sizeof(vctx->shared_secret), PAIR_VERIFY_MSG02);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Verify response 1: hkdf error getting derived_key";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// encrypted_data->value consists of the encrypted payload + the auth tag
|
|
if (encrypted_data->size < AUTHTAG_LENGTH)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Verify response 1: Invalid encrypted data";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encrypted_len = encrypted_data->size - AUTHTAG_LENGTH;
|
|
memcpy(tag, encrypted_data->value + encrypted_len, AUTHTAG_LENGTH);
|
|
memcpy(nonce + 4, pair_keys_map[PAIR_VERIFY_MSG02].nonce, NONCE_LENGTH - 4);
|
|
|
|
decrypted_data = malloc(encrypted_len);
|
|
|
|
ret = decrypt_chacha(decrypted_data, encrypted_data->value, encrypted_len, derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), NULL, 0, tag, sizeof(tag), nonce);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Verify response 1: Decryption error";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
response = message_process(decrypted_data, encrypted_len, &handle->errmsg);
|
|
if (!response)
|
|
{
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
device_id = pair_tlv_get_value(response, TLVType_Identifier);
|
|
signature = pair_tlv_get_value(response, TLVType_Signature);
|
|
if (!device_id || !signature || signature->size != crypto_sign_BYTES)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Verify response 1: Missing device ID or signature";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (vctx->verify_server_signature)
|
|
{
|
|
ret = verify_info(signature->value, vctx->server_public_key, vctx->server_eph_public_key, sizeof(vctx->server_eph_public_key),
|
|
device_id->value, device_id->size, vctx->client_eph_public_key, sizeof(vctx->client_eph_public_key));
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->errmsg = "Verify response 1: Invalid signature";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(decrypted_data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
free(decrypted_data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
client_verify_response2(struct pair_verify_context *handle, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_client_verify_context *vctx = &handle->vctx.client;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *response;
|
|
|
|
response = message_process(data, data_len, &handle->errmsg);
|
|
if (!response)
|
|
{
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(handle->result.shared_secret, vctx->shared_secret, sizeof(vctx->shared_secret));
|
|
handle->result.shared_secret_len = sizeof(vctx->shared_secret);
|
|
|
|
handle->status = PAIR_STATUS_COMPLETED;
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ------------------------- SERVER IMPLEMENTATION -------------------------- */
|
|
|
|
// Use (unsecure) keys seeded from device_id. We need the keys to always be the
|
|
// same during pair setup and pair verify, since the client saves them after
|
|
// pair-setup 3, so that the signature in pair-verify 1 can be checked.
|
|
static void
|
|
server_keypair(uint8_t *public_key, uint8_t *private_key, const char *device_id)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t seed[crypto_sign_SEEDBYTES] = { 0 };
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
len = strlen(device_id);
|
|
if (len > sizeof(seed))
|
|
len = sizeof(seed);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(seed, device_id, len);
|
|
|
|
crypto_sign_seed_keypair(public_key, private_key, seed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint8_t *
|
|
server_auth_failed_response(size_t *len, enum pair_keys msg_state)
|
|
{
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *response;
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
size_t data_len;
|
|
uint8_t error = TLVError_Authentication;
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE;
|
|
data = malloc(data_len);
|
|
response = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_State, &pair_keys_map[msg_state].state, sizeof(pair_keys_map[msg_state].state));
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_Error, &error, sizeof(error));
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_format(response, data, &data_len);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
|
|
*len = data_len;
|
|
|
|
return data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
server_setup_new(struct pair_setup_context *handle, const char *pin, pair_cb add_cb, void *cb_arg, const char *device_id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_server_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.server;
|
|
|
|
if (!is_initialized())
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (!pin)
|
|
pin = "3939";
|
|
|
|
if (!device_id || strlen(device_id) >= PAIR_AP_DEVICE_ID_LEN_MAX)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
sctx->pin = strdup(pin);
|
|
if (!sctx->pin)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
sctx->add_cb = add_cb;
|
|
sctx->add_cb_arg = cb_arg;
|
|
|
|
snprintf(sctx->device_id, sizeof(sctx->device_id), "%s", device_id);
|
|
|
|
server_keypair(sctx->public_key, sctx->private_key, sctx->device_id);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
server_setup_free(struct pair_setup_context *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_server_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.server;
|
|
|
|
srp_verifier_free(sctx->verifier);
|
|
|
|
free(sctx->pkA);
|
|
free(sctx->pkB);
|
|
free(sctx->b);
|
|
free(sctx->M1);
|
|
free(sctx->v);
|
|
free(sctx->salt);
|
|
free(sctx->pin);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
server_setup_request1(struct pair_setup_context *handle, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_server_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.server;
|
|
// enum pair_keys msg_state = PAIR_SETUP_MSG01;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *request;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *method;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *type;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
request = message_process(data, data_len, &handle->errmsg);
|
|
if (!request)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, handle->errmsg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
method = pair_tlv_get_value(request, TLVType_Method);
|
|
if (!method || method->size != 1 || method->value[0] != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup request 1: Missing or unexpected pairing method in TLV");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type = pair_tlv_get_value(request, TLVType_Flags);
|
|
sctx->is_transient = (type && type->size == 1 && type->value[0] == PairingFlagsTransient);
|
|
|
|
// Note this is modified to return a 16 byte salt
|
|
ret = srp_create_salted_verification_key(HASH_SHA512, SRP_NG_3072, USERNAME, (unsigned char *)sctx->pin, strlen(sctx->pin),
|
|
&sctx->salt, &sctx->salt_len, &sctx->v, &sctx->v_len, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup request 1: Could not create verification key");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = srp_verifier_start_authentication(HASH_SHA512, SRP_NG_3072, sctx->v, sctx->v_len,
|
|
&sctx->b, &sctx->b_len, &sctx->pkB, &sctx->pkB_len, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup request 1: Could not compute B");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
server_setup_request2(struct pair_setup_context *handle, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_server_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.server;
|
|
// enum pair_keys msg_state = PAIR_SETUP_MSG03;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *request;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *pk;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *proof;
|
|
|
|
request = message_process(data, data_len, &handle->errmsg);
|
|
if (!request)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, handle->errmsg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pk = pair_tlv_get_value(request, TLVType_PublicKey);
|
|
if (!pk || pk->size > N_len(SRP_NG_3072)) // 384 bytes or less
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup request 2: Missing og invalid public key");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
proof = pair_tlv_get_value(request, TLVType_Proof);
|
|
if (!proof || proof->size != SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup request 2: Missing or invalid proof");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sctx->pkA_len = pk->size;
|
|
sctx->pkA = malloc(sctx->pkA_len);
|
|
memcpy(sctx->pkA, pk->value, sctx->pkA_len);
|
|
|
|
sctx->M1_len = proof->size;
|
|
sctx->M1 = malloc(sctx->M1_len);
|
|
memcpy(sctx->M1, proof->value, sctx->M1_len);
|
|
|
|
sctx->verifier = srp_verifier_new(HASH_SHA512, SRP_NG_3072, USERNAME, sctx->salt, sctx->salt_len, sctx->v, sctx->v_len,
|
|
sctx->pkA, sctx->pkA_len, sctx->b, sctx->b_len, sctx->pkB, sctx->pkB_len, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if (!sctx->verifier)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->status = PAIR_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sctx->M2_len = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
|
srp_verifier_verify_session(sctx->verifier, sctx->M1, &sctx->M2);
|
|
if (!sctx->M2)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->status = PAIR_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
|
|
goto out; // Not an error, server should give proper TLV-formatet reply
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
server_setup_request3(struct pair_setup_context *handle, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_server_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.server;
|
|
enum pair_keys msg_state = PAIR_SETUP_MSG05;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *request;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *encrypted_data;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *device_id;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *pk;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *signature;
|
|
const uint8_t *session_key;
|
|
int session_key_len;
|
|
uint8_t nonce[NONCE_LENGTH] = { 0 };
|
|
uint8_t tag[AUTHTAG_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t derived_key[32];
|
|
size_t encrypted_len;
|
|
uint8_t *decrypted_data = NULL;
|
|
uint8_t device_x[32];
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
request = message_process(data, data_len, &handle->errmsg);
|
|
if (!request)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, handle->errmsg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
session_key = srp_verifier_get_session_key(sctx->verifier, &session_key_len);
|
|
if (!session_key)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup request 3: No valid session key");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = hkdf_extract_expand(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), session_key, session_key_len, msg_state);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup request 3: hkdf error getting derived_key");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encrypted_data = pair_tlv_get_value(request, TLVType_EncryptedData);
|
|
if (!encrypted_data)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup request 3: Missing encrypted_data");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// encrypted_data->value consists of the encrypted payload + the auth tag
|
|
if (encrypted_data->size < AUTHTAG_LENGTH)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup request 3: Invalid encrypted data");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encrypted_len = encrypted_data->size - AUTHTAG_LENGTH;
|
|
memcpy(tag, encrypted_data->value + encrypted_len, AUTHTAG_LENGTH);
|
|
memcpy(nonce + 4, pair_keys_map[msg_state].nonce, NONCE_LENGTH - 4);
|
|
|
|
decrypted_data = malloc(encrypted_len);
|
|
|
|
ret = decrypt_chacha(decrypted_data, encrypted_data->value, encrypted_len, derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), NULL, 0, tag, sizeof(tag), nonce);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup request 3: Decryption error");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
request = message_process(decrypted_data, encrypted_len, &handle->errmsg);
|
|
if (!request)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, handle->errmsg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = hkdf_extract_expand(device_x, sizeof(device_x), session_key, session_key_len, PAIR_SETUP_CONTROLLER_SIGN);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup request 3: hkdf error getting device_x");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
device_id = pair_tlv_get_value(request, TLVType_Identifier);
|
|
pk = pair_tlv_get_value(request, TLVType_PublicKey);
|
|
signature = pair_tlv_get_value(request, TLVType_Signature);
|
|
if (!device_id || device_id->size >= sizeof(handle->result.device_id) || !pk || pk->size != crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES || !signature || signature->size != crypto_sign_BYTES)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup request 3: Missing/invalid device ID, public key or signature");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = verify_info(signature->value, pk->value, device_x, sizeof(device_x), device_id->value, device_id->size, pk->value, pk->size);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->status = PAIR_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(handle->result.device_id, device_id->value, device_id->size);
|
|
memcpy(handle->result.client_public_key, pk->value, pk->size);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
free(decrypted_data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
free(decrypted_data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint8_t *
|
|
server_setup_response1(size_t *len, struct pair_setup_context *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_server_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.server;
|
|
enum pair_keys msg_state = PAIR_SETUP_MSG02;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *response;
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
size_t data_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (handle->status == PAIR_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED)
|
|
return server_auth_failed_response(len, msg_state);
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE;
|
|
data = malloc(data_len);
|
|
response = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_State, &pair_keys_map[msg_state].state, sizeof(pair_keys_map[msg_state].state));
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_Salt, sctx->salt, sctx->salt_len); // 16
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_PublicKey, sctx->pkB, sctx->pkB_len); // 384
|
|
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(response, data, &data_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup response 1: pair_tlv_format returned an error");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*len = data_len;
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return data;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
free(data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint8_t *
|
|
server_setup_response2(size_t *len, struct pair_setup_context *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_server_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.server;
|
|
enum pair_keys msg_state = PAIR_SETUP_MSG04;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *response;
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
size_t data_len;
|
|
const uint8_t *session_key;
|
|
int session_key_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (handle->status == PAIR_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED)
|
|
return server_auth_failed_response(len, msg_state);
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE;
|
|
data = malloc(data_len);
|
|
response = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_State, &pair_keys_map[msg_state].state, sizeof(pair_keys_map[msg_state].state));
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_Proof, sctx->M2, sctx->M2_len); // 384
|
|
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(response, data, &data_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup response 2: pair_tlv_format returned an error");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sctx->is_transient)
|
|
{
|
|
session_key = srp_verifier_get_session_key(sctx->verifier, &session_key_len);
|
|
if (!session_key)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup request 2: Could not compute session key");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(sizeof(handle->result.shared_secret) >= session_key_len);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(handle->result.shared_secret, session_key, session_key_len);
|
|
handle->result.shared_secret_len = session_key_len;
|
|
|
|
handle->status = PAIR_STATUS_COMPLETED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*len = data_len;
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return data;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
free(data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint8_t *
|
|
server_setup_response3(size_t *len, struct pair_setup_context *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_server_setup_context *sctx = &handle->sctx.server;
|
|
enum pair_keys msg_state = PAIR_SETUP_MSG06;
|
|
const uint8_t *session_key;
|
|
int session_key_len;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *response;
|
|
uint8_t nonce[NONCE_LENGTH] = { 0 };
|
|
uint8_t tag[AUTHTAG_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t derived_key[32];
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *append;
|
|
size_t append_len;
|
|
uint8_t *encrypted_data = NULL;
|
|
size_t encrypted_data_len;
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
size_t data_len;
|
|
uint8_t device_x[32];
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (handle->status == PAIR_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED)
|
|
return server_auth_failed_response(len, msg_state);
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE;
|
|
data = malloc(data_len);
|
|
response = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
|
|
session_key = srp_verifier_get_session_key(sctx->verifier, &session_key_len);
|
|
if (!session_key)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup response 3: No valid session key");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = hkdf_extract_expand(device_x, sizeof(device_x), session_key, session_key_len, PAIR_SETUP_ACCESSORY_SIGN);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup response 3: hkdf error getting device_x");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = create_and_sign_device_info(data, &data_len, sctx->device_id, device_x, sizeof(device_x), sctx->public_key, sizeof(sctx->public_key), sctx->private_key);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup response 3: create device info returned an error");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Append TLV-encoded public key to *data, which already has identifier and signature
|
|
append = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
append_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE - data_len;
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(append, TLVType_PublicKey, sctx->public_key, sizeof(sctx->public_key));
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(append, data + data_len, &append_len);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(append);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup response 3: error appending public key to TLV");
|
|
}
|
|
data_len += append_len;
|
|
|
|
ret = hkdf_extract_expand(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), session_key, session_key_len, msg_state);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup response 3: hkdf error getting derived_key");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(nonce + 4, pair_keys_map[msg_state].nonce, NONCE_LENGTH - 4);
|
|
|
|
encrypted_data_len = data_len + sizeof(tag); // Space for ciphered payload and authtag
|
|
encrypted_data = malloc(encrypted_data_len);
|
|
|
|
ret = encrypt_chacha(encrypted_data, data, data_len, derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), NULL, 0, tag, sizeof(tag), nonce);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup response 3: Could not encrypt");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(encrypted_data + data_len, tag, sizeof(tag));
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_State, &pair_keys_map[msg_state].state, sizeof(pair_keys_map[msg_state].state));
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_EncryptedData, encrypted_data, encrypted_data_len);
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE; // Re-using *data, so pass original length to pair_tlv_format
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(response, data, &data_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Setup response 3: error appending public key to TLV");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sctx->add_cb)
|
|
sctx->add_cb(handle->result.client_public_key, handle->result.device_id, sctx->add_cb_arg);
|
|
|
|
handle->status = PAIR_STATUS_COMPLETED;
|
|
|
|
*len = data_len;
|
|
|
|
free(encrypted_data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return data;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
free(encrypted_data);
|
|
free(data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
server_verify_new(struct pair_verify_context *handle, const char *client_setup_keys, pair_cb cb, void *cb_arg, const char *device_id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_server_verify_context *vctx = &handle->vctx.server;
|
|
|
|
if (!is_initialized())
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (client_setup_keys)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (!device_id || strlen(device_id) >= PAIR_AP_DEVICE_ID_LEN_MAX)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
snprintf(vctx->device_id, sizeof(vctx->device_id), "%s", device_id);
|
|
|
|
vctx->get_cb = cb;
|
|
vctx->get_cb_arg = cb_arg;
|
|
vctx->verify_client_signature = cb;
|
|
|
|
server_keypair(vctx->server_public_key, vctx->server_private_key, vctx->device_id);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
server_verify_request1(struct pair_verify_context *handle, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_server_verify_context *vctx = &handle->vctx.server;
|
|
// enum pair_keys msg_state = PAIR_VERIFY_MSG01;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *request;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *pk;
|
|
|
|
request = message_process(data, data_len, &handle->errmsg);
|
|
if (!request)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, handle->errmsg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pk = pair_tlv_get_value(request, TLVType_PublicKey);
|
|
if (!pk || pk->size != sizeof(vctx->client_eph_public_key))
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Verify request 1: Missing or invalid public_key");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(vctx->client_eph_public_key, pk->value, sizeof(vctx->client_eph_public_key));
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
server_verify_request2(struct pair_verify_context *handle, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_server_verify_context *vctx = &handle->vctx.server;
|
|
enum pair_keys msg_state = PAIR_VERIFY_MSG03;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *request;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *encrypted_data;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *device_id;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *signature;
|
|
uint8_t nonce[NONCE_LENGTH] = { 0 };
|
|
uint8_t tag[AUTHTAG_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t derived_key[32];
|
|
size_t encrypted_len;
|
|
uint8_t *decrypted_data = NULL;
|
|
char id_str[PAIR_AP_DEVICE_ID_LEN_MAX] = { 0 };
|
|
uint8_t client_public_key[crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
request = message_process(data, data_len, &handle->errmsg);
|
|
if (!request)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, handle->errmsg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = hkdf_extract_expand(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), vctx->shared_secret, sizeof(vctx->shared_secret), msg_state);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Verify request 2: hkdf error getting derived_key");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encrypted_data = pair_tlv_get_value(request, TLVType_EncryptedData);
|
|
if (!encrypted_data)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Verify request 2: Missing encrypted_data");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// encrypted_data->value consists of the encrypted payload + the auth tag
|
|
if (encrypted_data->size < AUTHTAG_LENGTH)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Verify request 2: Invalid encrypted data");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
encrypted_len = encrypted_data->size - AUTHTAG_LENGTH;
|
|
memcpy(tag, encrypted_data->value + encrypted_len, AUTHTAG_LENGTH);
|
|
memcpy(nonce + 4, pair_keys_map[msg_state].nonce, NONCE_LENGTH - 4);
|
|
|
|
decrypted_data = malloc(encrypted_len);
|
|
|
|
ret = decrypt_chacha(decrypted_data, encrypted_data->value, encrypted_len, derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), NULL, 0, tag, sizeof(tag), nonce);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Verify request 2: Decryption error");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
request = message_process(decrypted_data, encrypted_len, &handle->errmsg);
|
|
if (!request)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, handle->errmsg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
device_id = pair_tlv_get_value(request, TLVType_Identifier);
|
|
signature = pair_tlv_get_value(request, TLVType_Signature);
|
|
if (!device_id || !signature || signature->size != crypto_sign_BYTES)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Verify request 2: Missing identifier or signature");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (vctx->verify_client_signature)
|
|
{
|
|
if (device_id->size >= sizeof(id_str))
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Verify request 2: Device ID from peer is too long");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(id_str, device_id->value, device_id->size);
|
|
|
|
ret = vctx->get_cb(client_public_key, id_str, vctx->get_cb_arg);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->status = PAIR_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = verify_info(signature->value, client_public_key, vctx->client_eph_public_key, sizeof(vctx->client_eph_public_key),
|
|
device_id->value, device_id->size, vctx->server_eph_public_key, sizeof(vctx->server_eph_public_key));
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
handle->status = PAIR_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
free(decrypted_data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
free(decrypted_data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint8_t *
|
|
server_verify_response1(size_t *len, struct pair_verify_context *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_server_verify_context *vctx = &handle->vctx.server;
|
|
enum pair_keys msg_state = PAIR_VERIFY_MSG02;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *response;
|
|
uint8_t nonce[NONCE_LENGTH] = { 0 };
|
|
uint8_t tag[AUTHTAG_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t derived_key[32];
|
|
uint8_t *encrypted_data = NULL;
|
|
size_t encrypted_data_len;
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
size_t data_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (handle->status == PAIR_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED)
|
|
return server_auth_failed_response(len, msg_state);
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE;
|
|
data = malloc(data_len);
|
|
response = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
|
|
crypto_box_keypair(vctx->server_eph_public_key, vctx->server_eph_private_key);
|
|
|
|
ret = crypto_scalarmult(vctx->shared_secret, vctx->server_eph_private_key, vctx->client_eph_public_key);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Verify response 1: Error generating shared secret");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = create_and_sign_accessory_info(data, &data_len, vctx->server_eph_public_key, sizeof(vctx->server_eph_public_key), vctx->device_id,
|
|
vctx->client_eph_public_key, sizeof(vctx->client_eph_public_key), vctx->server_private_key);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Verify response 1: Error creating device info");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = hkdf_extract_expand(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), vctx->shared_secret, sizeof(vctx->shared_secret), msg_state);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Verify response 1: hkdf error getting derived_key");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(nonce + 4, pair_keys_map[msg_state].nonce, NONCE_LENGTH - 4);
|
|
|
|
encrypted_data_len = data_len + sizeof(tag); // Space for ciphered payload and authtag
|
|
encrypted_data = malloc(encrypted_data_len);
|
|
|
|
ret = encrypt_chacha(encrypted_data, data, data_len, derived_key, sizeof(derived_key), NULL, 0, tag, sizeof(tag), nonce);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Verify response 1: Could not encrypt");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(encrypted_data + data_len, tag, sizeof(tag));
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_State, &pair_keys_map[msg_state].state, sizeof(pair_keys_map[msg_state].state));
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_PublicKey, vctx->server_eph_public_key, sizeof(vctx->server_eph_public_key));
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_EncryptedData, encrypted_data, encrypted_data_len);
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE; // Re-using *data, so pass original length to pair_tlv_format
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(response, data, &data_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Verify response 1: pair_tlv_format returned an error");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*len = data_len;
|
|
|
|
free(encrypted_data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return data;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
free(encrypted_data);
|
|
free(data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint8_t *
|
|
server_verify_response2(size_t *len, struct pair_verify_context *handle)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_server_verify_context *vctx = &handle->vctx.server;
|
|
enum pair_keys msg_state = PAIR_VERIFY_MSG04;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *response;
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
size_t data_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (handle->status == PAIR_STATUS_AUTH_FAILED)
|
|
return server_auth_failed_response(len, msg_state);
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE;
|
|
data = malloc(data_len);
|
|
response = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_State, &pair_keys_map[msg_state].state, sizeof(pair_keys_map[msg_state].state));
|
|
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(response, data, &data_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
RETURN_ERROR(PAIR_STATUS_INVALID, "Verify response 2: pair_tlv_format returned an error");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*len = data_len;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(handle->result.shared_secret, vctx->shared_secret, sizeof(vctx->shared_secret));
|
|
handle->result.shared_secret_len = sizeof(vctx->shared_secret);
|
|
|
|
handle->status = PAIR_STATUS_COMPLETED;
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return data;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
free(data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
server_add_remove_request(pair_cb cb, void *cb_arg, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *errmsg;
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *request;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *device_id;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *pk;
|
|
char id_str[PAIR_AP_DEVICE_ID_LEN_MAX] = { 0 };
|
|
uint8_t *public_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
request = message_process(in, in_len, &errmsg);
|
|
if (!request)
|
|
{
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
device_id = pair_tlv_get_value(request, TLVType_Identifier);
|
|
if (!device_id || device_id->size >= sizeof(id_str))
|
|
{
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Only present when adding
|
|
pk = pair_tlv_get_value(request, TLVType_PublicKey);
|
|
if (pk && pk->size == crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES)
|
|
{
|
|
public_key = pk->value;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(id_str, device_id->value, device_id->size);
|
|
|
|
cb(public_key, id_str, cb_arg);
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
pair_tlv_free(request);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint8_t *
|
|
server_add_remove_response(size_t *len)
|
|
{
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *response;
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
uint8_t state = 2;
|
|
size_t data_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE;
|
|
data = malloc(data_len);
|
|
response = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_State, &state, sizeof(state));
|
|
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(response, data, &data_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*len = data_len;
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return data;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
free(data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
server_add_remove(uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, pair_cb cb, void *cb_arg, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = server_add_remove_request(cb, cb_arg, in, in_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
*out = server_add_remove_response(out_len);
|
|
if (!*out)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
server_list_cb(uint8_t public_key[crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES], const char *device_id, void *cb_arg)
|
|
{
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *response = cb_arg;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *previous_id;
|
|
uint8_t permissions = 1; // Means admin (TODO don't hardcode - let caller set)
|
|
|
|
// If this isn't the first iteration (item) then we must add a separator
|
|
previous_id = pair_tlv_get_value(response, TLVType_Identifier);
|
|
if (previous_id)
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_Separator, NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_Identifier, (unsigned char *)device_id, strlen(device_id));
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_PublicKey, public_key, crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_Permissions, &permissions, sizeof(permissions));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint8_t *
|
|
server_list_response(size_t *len, pair_list_cb cb, void *cb_arg)
|
|
{
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *response;
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
uint8_t state = 2;
|
|
size_t data_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
data_len = REQUEST_BUFSIZE;
|
|
data = malloc(data_len);
|
|
response = pair_tlv_new();
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_add_value(response, TLVType_State, &state, sizeof(state));
|
|
|
|
cb(server_list_cb, response, cb_arg);
|
|
|
|
ret = pair_tlv_format(response, data, &data_len);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*len = data_len;
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return data;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
free(data);
|
|
pair_tlv_free(response);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
server_list(uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len, pair_list_cb cb, void *cb_arg, const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len)
|
|
{
|
|
// Skip reading the request, it just has state = 1 and pair method =
|
|
// PairingMethodListPairings
|
|
|
|
*out = server_list_response(out_len, cb, cb_arg);
|
|
if (!*out)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ----------------------- CIPHERING IMPLEMENTATION ------------------------- */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
cipher_free(struct pair_cipher_context *cctx)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!cctx)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
free(cctx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct pair_cipher_context *
|
|
cipher_new_with_salt_and_info(struct pair_definition *type, const uint8_t *shared_secret, size_t shared_secret_len, const char *write_salt, const char *write_info, const char *read_salt, const char *read_info)
|
|
{
|
|
struct pair_cipher_context *cctx;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
cctx = calloc(1, sizeof(struct pair_cipher_context));
|
|
if (!cctx)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
cctx->type = type;
|
|
|
|
ret = hkdf_extract_expand_with_salt_and_info(cctx->encryption_key, sizeof(cctx->encryption_key), shared_secret, shared_secret_len, write_salt, write_info);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
ret = hkdf_extract_expand_with_salt_and_info(cctx->decryption_key, sizeof(cctx->decryption_key), shared_secret, shared_secret_len, read_salt, read_info);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
return cctx;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
pair_cipher_free(cctx);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct pair_cipher_context *
|
|
cipher_new(struct pair_definition *type, int channel, const uint8_t *shared_secret, size_t shared_secret_len, const char *dynamic_salt_suffix)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
enum pair_keys write_key;
|
|
enum pair_keys read_key;
|
|
|
|
// Note that events is opposite, probably because it is a reverse connection
|
|
switch (channel)
|
|
{
|
|
case 0: // control
|
|
write_key = PAIR_CONTROL_WRITE;
|
|
read_key = PAIR_CONTROL_READ;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 1: // events
|
|
write_key = PAIR_EVENTS_READ;
|
|
read_key = PAIR_EVENTS_WRITE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 2: // data
|
|
write_key = PAIR_DATA_WRITE;
|
|
read_key = PAIR_DATA_READ;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 3: // control
|
|
write_key = PAIR_CONTROL_READ;
|
|
read_key = PAIR_CONTROL_WRITE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 4: // events
|
|
write_key = PAIR_EVENTS_WRITE;
|
|
read_key = PAIR_EVENTS_READ;
|
|
break;
|
|
case 5: // data
|
|
write_key = PAIR_DATA_READ;
|
|
read_key = PAIR_DATA_WRITE;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
//if ((dynamic_salt_suffix == NULL) || (dynamic_salt_suffix[0] == '\0')) {
|
|
// return cipher_new_with_salt_and_info(type, shared_secret, shared_secret_len, pair_keys_map[write_key].salt, pair_keys_map[write_key].info, pair_keys_map[read_key].salt, pair_keys_map[read_key].info);
|
|
//} else {
|
|
char write_salt[256] = "";
|
|
char read_salt[256] = "";
|
|
snprintf(write_salt, sizeof(write_salt), "%s%s", pair_keys_map[write_key].salt, dynamic_salt_suffix);
|
|
//printf("channel %d, dynamic_salt_suffix: \"%s\", write_salt: \"%s\"\n", channel, dynamic_salt_suffix, write_salt);
|
|
snprintf(read_salt, sizeof(read_salt), "%s%s", pair_keys_map[read_key].salt, dynamic_salt_suffix);
|
|
//printf("channel %d, dynamic_salt_suffix: \"%s\", read_salt: \"%s\"\n", channel, dynamic_salt_suffix, read_salt);
|
|
return cipher_new_with_salt_and_info(type, shared_secret, shared_secret_len, write_salt, pair_keys_map[write_key].info, read_salt, pair_keys_map[read_key].info);
|
|
//}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t
|
|
encrypt(uint8_t **ciphertext, size_t *ciphertext_len, const uint8_t *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len, struct pair_cipher_context *cctx)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t nonce[NONCE_LENGTH] = { 0 };
|
|
uint8_t tag[AUTHTAG_LENGTH];
|
|
const uint8_t *plain_block;
|
|
uint8_t *cipher_block;
|
|
uint16_t block_len;
|
|
int nblocks;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if (plaintext_len == 0 || !plaintext)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
// Encryption is done in blocks, where each block consists of a short, the
|
|
// encrypted data and an auth tag. The short is the size of the encrypted
|
|
// data. The encrypted data in the block cannot exceed ENCRYPTED_LEN_MAX.
|
|
nblocks = 1 + ((plaintext_len - 1) / ENCRYPTED_LEN_MAX); // Ceiling of division
|
|
|
|
*ciphertext_len = nblocks * (sizeof(block_len) + AUTHTAG_LENGTH) + plaintext_len;
|
|
*ciphertext = malloc(*ciphertext_len);
|
|
|
|
cctx->encryption_counter_prev = cctx->encryption_counter;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0, plain_block = plaintext, cipher_block = *ciphertext; i < nblocks; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
// If it is the last block we will encrypt only the remaining data
|
|
block_len = (i + 1 == nblocks) ? (plaintext + plaintext_len - plain_block) : ENCRYPTED_LEN_MAX;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(nonce + 4, &(cctx->encryption_counter), sizeof(cctx->encryption_counter));// TODO BE or LE?
|
|
|
|
// Write the ciphered block
|
|
memcpy(cipher_block, &block_len, sizeof(block_len)); // TODO BE or LE?
|
|
ret = encrypt_chacha(cipher_block + sizeof(block_len), plain_block, block_len, cctx->encryption_key, sizeof(cctx->encryption_key), &block_len, sizeof(block_len), tag, sizeof(tag), nonce);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
cctx->errmsg = "Encryption with chacha poly1305 failed";
|
|
cctx->encryption_counter = cctx->encryption_counter_prev;
|
|
free(*ciphertext);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(cipher_block + sizeof(block_len) + block_len, tag, AUTHTAG_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
plain_block += block_len;
|
|
cipher_block += block_len + sizeof(block_len) + AUTHTAG_LENGTH;
|
|
cctx->encryption_counter++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_PAIR
|
|
hexdump("Encrypted:\n", *ciphertext, *ciphertext_len);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return plain_block - plaintext;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t
|
|
decrypt(uint8_t **plaintext, size_t *plaintext_len, const uint8_t *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_len, struct pair_cipher_context *cctx)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t nonce[NONCE_LENGTH] = { 0 };
|
|
uint8_t tag[AUTHTAG_LENGTH];
|
|
uint8_t *plain_block;
|
|
const uint8_t *cipher_block;
|
|
uint16_t block_len;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (ciphertext_len < sizeof(block_len) || !ciphertext)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
// This will allocate more than we need. Since we don't know the number of
|
|
// blocks in the ciphertext yet we can't calculate the exact required length.
|
|
*plaintext = malloc(ciphertext_len);
|
|
|
|
cctx->decryption_counter_prev = cctx->decryption_counter;
|
|
|
|
for (plain_block = *plaintext, cipher_block = ciphertext; cipher_block < ciphertext + ciphertext_len; )
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy(&block_len, cipher_block, sizeof(block_len)); // TODO BE or LE?
|
|
if (cipher_block + block_len + sizeof(block_len) + AUTHTAG_LENGTH > ciphertext + ciphertext_len)
|
|
{
|
|
// The remaining ciphertext doesn't contain an entire block, so stop
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(tag, cipher_block + sizeof(block_len) + block_len, sizeof(tag));
|
|
memcpy(nonce + 4, &(cctx->decryption_counter), sizeof(cctx->decryption_counter));// TODO BE or LE?
|
|
|
|
ret = decrypt_chacha(plain_block, cipher_block + sizeof(block_len), block_len, cctx->decryption_key, sizeof(cctx->decryption_key), &block_len, sizeof(block_len), tag, sizeof(tag), nonce);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
{
|
|
cctx->errmsg = "Decryption with chacha poly1305 failed";
|
|
cctx->decryption_counter = cctx->decryption_counter_prev;
|
|
free(*plaintext);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
plain_block += block_len;
|
|
cipher_block += block_len + sizeof(block_len) + AUTHTAG_LENGTH;
|
|
cctx->decryption_counter++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*plaintext_len = plain_block - *plaintext;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_PAIR
|
|
hexdump("Decrypted:\n", *plaintext, *plaintext_len);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return cipher_block - ciphertext;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
state_get(const char **errmsg, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
|
|
{
|
|
pair_tlv_values_t *message;
|
|
pair_tlv_t *state;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!data || data_len == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
return 0; // state 0 = no incoming data yet -> first request
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
message = message_process(data, data_len, errmsg);
|
|
if (!message)
|
|
{
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
state = pair_tlv_get_value(message, TLVType_State);
|
|
if (!state || state->size != 1)
|
|
{
|
|
*errmsg = "Could not get message state";
|
|
goto error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = state->value[0];
|
|
|
|
pair_tlv_free(message);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
pair_tlv_free(message);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
public_key_get(uint8_t server_public_key[crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES], const char *device_id)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t private_key[crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES];
|
|
server_keypair(server_public_key, private_key, device_id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const struct pair_definition pair_client_homekit_normal =
|
|
{
|
|
.pair_setup_new = client_setup_new,
|
|
.pair_setup_free = client_setup_free,
|
|
.pair_setup_result = client_setup_result,
|
|
|
|
.pair_setup_request1 = client_setup_request1,
|
|
.pair_setup_request2 = client_setup_request2,
|
|
.pair_setup_request3 = client_setup_request3,
|
|
|
|
.pair_setup_response1 = client_setup_response1,
|
|
.pair_setup_response2 = client_setup_response2,
|
|
.pair_setup_response3 = client_setup_response3,
|
|
|
|
.pair_verify_new = client_verify_new,
|
|
|
|
.pair_verify_request1 = client_verify_request1,
|
|
.pair_verify_request2 = client_verify_request2,
|
|
|
|
.pair_verify_response1 = client_verify_response1,
|
|
.pair_verify_response2 = client_verify_response2,
|
|
|
|
.pair_cipher_new = cipher_new,
|
|
.pair_cipher_free = cipher_free,
|
|
|
|
.pair_encrypt = encrypt,
|
|
.pair_decrypt = decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.pair_state_get = state_get,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const struct pair_definition pair_client_homekit_transient =
|
|
{
|
|
.pair_setup_new = client_setup_new,
|
|
.pair_setup_free = client_setup_free,
|
|
|
|
.pair_setup_request1 = client_setup_request1,
|
|
.pair_setup_request2 = client_setup_request2,
|
|
.pair_setup_request3 = client_setup_request3,
|
|
|
|
.pair_setup_response1 = client_setup_response1,
|
|
.pair_setup_response2 = client_setup_response2,
|
|
.pair_setup_response3 = client_setup_response3,
|
|
|
|
.pair_verify_new = client_verify_new,
|
|
|
|
.pair_verify_request1 = client_verify_request1,
|
|
.pair_verify_request2 = client_verify_request2,
|
|
|
|
.pair_verify_response1 = client_verify_response1,
|
|
.pair_verify_response2 = client_verify_response2,
|
|
|
|
.pair_cipher_new = cipher_new,
|
|
.pair_cipher_free = cipher_free,
|
|
|
|
.pair_encrypt = encrypt,
|
|
.pair_decrypt = decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.pair_state_get = state_get,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
const struct pair_definition pair_server_homekit =
|
|
{
|
|
.pair_setup_new = server_setup_new,
|
|
.pair_setup_free = server_setup_free,
|
|
|
|
.pair_setup_request1 = server_setup_response1,
|
|
.pair_setup_request2 = server_setup_response2,
|
|
.pair_setup_request3 = server_setup_response3,
|
|
|
|
.pair_setup_response1 = server_setup_request1,
|
|
.pair_setup_response2 = server_setup_request2,
|
|
.pair_setup_response3 = server_setup_request3,
|
|
|
|
.pair_verify_new = server_verify_new,
|
|
|
|
.pair_verify_request1 = server_verify_response1,
|
|
.pair_verify_request2 = server_verify_response2,
|
|
|
|
.pair_verify_response1 = server_verify_request1,
|
|
.pair_verify_response2 = server_verify_request2,
|
|
|
|
.pair_add = server_add_remove,
|
|
.pair_remove = server_add_remove,
|
|
.pair_list = server_list,
|
|
|
|
.pair_cipher_new = cipher_new,
|
|
.pair_cipher_free = cipher_free,
|
|
|
|
.pair_encrypt = encrypt,
|
|
.pair_decrypt = decrypt,
|
|
|
|
.pair_state_get = state_get,
|
|
.pair_public_key_get = public_key_get,
|
|
};
|